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Nomadic pastoralists and the traditional political economy-a
Rejoinder

rejoinder to Cox.

by Melvyn C. Goldstein (Case Western Reserve University)

Romanticizing traditional Tibetan society and revising its history in accordance with contemporary
political expedience is growing as the political contest between the Dalai Lama and China over the status of
contemporary Tibet intensifies. Cox's response to my rejoinder seems another thinly veiled example of this
revisionist trend. I found particularly astonishing his comment that, "The fact that Tibetans (in the face of
considerable Chinese propaganda to the contrary) are trying to convey to the world the fact that the nomadic
inhabitants oftheir country did have considerable freedom and autonomy before the Chinese invaded, I makes
Goldstein's irresponsible use ofthe term [serf] particularly reprehensible." (Cox 1991: 151)
Mr. Cox is apparently suggesting that use of the term "serf' for Tibetan social institutions is
"irresponsible" because (l) there is no empirical justification for use ofthe term, and (2) because its use hurts
the political cause of the Tibetans in exile.
With regard to the latter point, if Mr. Cox believes that scholars ofTibctan society have an obligation to
support Tibetans who are engaged in a political struggle with the Chinese over the status ofTibet, then I disagree
strongly. Scholarship should produce objective and insightful analyses regardless of whether they support or
contradict the claims of any particular political interest group.
And with regard to the evidence for serfdom in Tibet, I am astonished that Mr. Cox believes that there
is no justification for the use ofthis term and thus that its use is academically irresponsible. There is a long
and detailed literature on the nature of Tibet's peasantry and its relevance to serfdom, including a detailed
exchange between myself and Professor Beatrice Miller on precisely the issue ofthe applicability of "serfdom"
to Tibetan institutions in The Tibetan Review (Goldstein 1986, 1988, 1989).2 In other words, my use of
"serfdom" is an issue about which I have presented my views in-depth. And while I certainly accept the right
of others to disagree with my interpretations, to suggest they are irresponsible is simply preposterous. If there
is any scholarly irresponsibility, it is Mr. Cox's incomprehensible failure to mention the existence of this
literature and evaluate it.
Since Mr. Cox made the very serious accusation of academic irresponsibility, I feel compelled to respond
to his charge by discussing the basis of my classifying the Tibetan political economy as a variant of the
institution of serfdom. I will start with a discussion of Tibet's agricultural peasants since they will serve as
a baseline against which to compare the new ethnographic data on the nomadic pastoralists of Pal a in western
Tibet.

The traditional Tibetan agricultural mode of production
Eric Wolf( 1982:75) has written that "each major way human beings organize their production constitutes
a mode of production-a
specific, historically occurring set of social relations through which labor is deployed
to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, skills, organization, and knowledge."
Wolf (Ibid.) sets out three basic modes of production: the kinship, tributary and capitalist modes. In the
tributary mode of production, the workers have access to the means of production-Iand-but
they are
compelled to provide "tribute". i.e., services in kind and labor, to lords who use political force to compel the
workers to comply. States utilizing the tributary mode of production ranged from decentralized feudal polities
to highly centralized states, and over time, individual polities have shifted in both directions along this
continuum.

(and their sub-units) and the Lhasa government. The aristocratic (sger gzhis) and monastic estates (chosgzhis)
typically consisted of two components: (I) the means of production-arable
land and/or pastureland, and (2)
laborers-hereditarily
bound peasants that provided the lord of the estate a captive labor force.
Characteristically, the farming estates consisted of a "demesne" or lord's land segment (roughly 50-70%
of the total arable land) and a "tenement" or peasant's land section. All work on the demesne land was done
by the bound peasants as a corvee ('u lag) obligation without reimbursement. The lord received the entire yield
from this land. This corvee obligation was known in Tibetan as nang khral ("inner tax) and was a type of rkang
'gro ("going on foot") corvee tax. Peasants on such estates mayor may not have had to provide goods in-kind
also.
The basic unit of peasant taxation was the khral rkang ("tax-rkang"). It was a unit oftenement land whose
size was based on the amount of seed sown on the field.3 There was no national standard for the size of taxrkang and it varied from lord to lord, but in the areas around Lhasa one tax-rkang ranged typically from 10
son khal to 14 son khal.4 Corvee taxes were owed to the lord on the basis of the number oftax-rkang a household
held, for example, holders of one tax-rkang of land had to provide one person to work for the estate every day,
and two persons at times of peak agricultural activities in Spring and Fall (calledgnyis bkul). 5 On top ofthat
a third person was required at particularly heavy work times. This right was called dud gnam gtong
("[households] "that send smoke into the sky" li.e., everyone)). Peasant families rarely held more than one
tax-rkang of land.
The authority of lords over their people can be seen by the lord's right to move people from their estate
to provide corvee labor elsewhere. For example, in the late 1940's the Para Chiso (pha ra spyi so--<>ne of the
two chief economic managers ofDrepung monastery) implemented a new scheme for collecting firewood for
the daily prayer tea the monastery served monks. He found a mountain area in Phembo (north of Lhasa) with
extensive firewood and moved 12 young unmarried men from the Drepung Chiso's Phembo estates to that
mountain. They were required to cut wood and transport it to the Lhasa River where it was shipped by coracle
boat to Drepung. These young men were taken by their lord as a corvee tax (i.e. they had no choice), and had
to work there for the term of office of the Para Chiso-ten years. They received no salary during that time,
but the lord gave each of their households a one person exemption from the daily worker corvee obligation on
their estate.6
Each estate usually had a resident manager/steward (gzhis sdod or gnyer pa) sent by the lord to oversee
production on the demesne portion ofthe estate. The peasants also had a headmen (rgan po) who was generally
appointed from among the peasant households by the estate steward, but sometimes also rotated among the
peasant households.
The part ofthe estate not allocated as the lord's demesne fields was divided among the peasant households.
They farmed this "tenement" land and derived their subsistence from it. Usufruct rights to this land were
hereditable, but peasant households were not free to sell such land as it was o\yned by the estate.
In addition to religious and aristocratic estates, a substantial segment of farm and pasture land was
controlled by the central government. This land sometimes was organized in the form of manorial estates
similarto those described above, but more often consisted of villages in which there was no demesne land, i.e.,
all of the arable land in these villages was distributed as tenement land among peasant households. This kind
of peasant was known as agzhung rgvug pa ("government server"). The peasants on these government estates
were also bound to their land, and had corvee labor and in-kind tax obligations on the basis oftax-rkang.7
The Tibet political economy in fanning areas, therefore, centered around the institution of the manorial
estate with its concatenation of arable land and a captive labor force. Peasants were hereditarily bound to their
estates and did not have the legal right to give up their land and seek their fortune elsewhere. They could of
course run away-as could slaves in the U.S. south-but legally they could not decide to move somewhere else
and unilaterally terminate their obligation to the estate. Lords had the right to pursue runaway peasants and
forcibly bring them back to their estate and punish them. This right was called I/Ii rtsa yul bkog ("uprooting
people from an area"). This linkage to an estate and lord was transmilled hereditarily by parallel descent-

men's sons became subjects of their father's lord, and women's daughters became subjects of their mother's
lord. If estates changed hands, as sometimes happened, the bound peasants remained with the land and became
the subjects of the new lord.
The permanent subservience-bound
status--of peasants to their estates and lords is seen clearly when
individuals desired to leave the estate permanently, for example to marry or to join a monastery. If a person
wanted to go as a bride or groom to the household of someone belonging to a dilTerent lord, his or her lord had
to grant permission. Several institutionalized options were available.
The simplest was known as "person exchange" (lIIi b1'je). In this option the person marrying out was
replaced by someone coming from the estate to which he or he was going. This normally involved someone
from the other estate coming as a bride or groom, but sometimes a servant or person without any tax-rkang
land was sent as an "exchange" person. This option meant that neither lord lost a subject.
A second option was for the lord of the out-going bride or groom to permit the person to leave but not to
change her or his subject status. The person marrying-out would remain a subject of the original lord as would
all of her /his same-sex children, in perpetuity.8 Such persons were given a status called "human lease" (mi
bogs) since they were "leasing" their freedom to live and work elsewhere. They typically paid an annual tax
(usually in money but sometimes also in labor or in goods) to the original lord as did their children ofthe same
sex. Lords kept detailed records of their "human lease" subjects, including births and deaths and annual mi
bogs payments. An examination of this institution including an example of a "human lease" document is
found in Goldstein (1971).
A third, rare, option occurred when a lord completely relinquished his rights over the person andtheir
future same-sex progeny by granting them "human release" (lIIi 'kh1'ol [or dpon 'khrol-"release from lord").
This, however, was not often granted. A variant ofthis was the "religion release" (chos 'khrol) given to persons
becoming monks or nuns. Although this permission was inevitably granted, it did not permanently sever the
subject's obligations to his lord. It was valid only while as the person remained a monk in good standing. If
a monk was expelled from the monastery his previous serf status was reactivated. This residual right of lords
was called: skya rtsa rang bdag ("layman--own lord").
In addition to these options, lords had the right to transfer (give) certain types of their subject peasants
to other lords. Usually this occurred with their house servants (nang zan) or with peasants without tax-rkang
land. In such cases, the lord transferring the person usually gave the receiving lord a 'khrol 'dzin ("release
document") which certified that the person now belonged to him. Although this was not a common practice
in Tibet, and there was no custom of buying and selling people, it is clear that such transfers of people from
one lord to another did occur.
Similar to this was the institution of "tax appendage" (khral snon). This involved a lord giving a person
to one of his taxpayer peasant households that was short onabor (see Goldstein 1986 for a discussion of this).
It was, therefore, this pervasive jural system in which peasants were hereditarily bound to
agricultural estates held by lords that I have referred to in numerous past articles as serfdom. This
system also clearly fits the definition of serfdom olTered by Cox-" A serf is an agricultural laborer
who is bound to the land to such an extent that he may be transferred with the land to another owner."
The reader wiII have noted that I did not use the term serfto describe the "peasants" in the above
discussion. I did this deliberately to indicate, as I have in the past, that conceptually there are two
separate issues with regard to the study of the political economy in traditional Tibetan society. The
first, and certainly the most important issue, is to delineate objectively the fundamental structure and
functioning ofthat system in its various permutations throughout Tibet-Le., the nature of obligations
and rights of peasants and lords and the estate system in which they coexisted. This can be done
without the raising the issue of serfdom.
The second issue concerns the place of that system vis-a-vis other traditional states. In the case
of Tibet, I find serfdom a heuristic construct because it focuses attention on the similarities shared

by a range of political economies that have existed in different parts of the world in different erasnamely, their utilization of a system of extraction in which a labor force was hereditarily bound to
a productive resource controlled by a lord.
Given this background, let me now turn specifically to the situation of nomadic pastoralism in
the traditional Tibetan state.

The nomadic pastoralists

of Pala

The notion of nomadic pastoralists as autonomous or semi-autonomous tribes that roam the far-flung
hinterlands of agricultural states has so dominated the popular and scholarly imagination, that it is now
commonly believed to be a fundamental characteristic of pastoral nomadism per se. Consequently, obtaining
a better understanding of how nomadic pastoralists functioned within the Tibetan state was one reason why
my colleague Dr. Beall and I decided to conduct fieldwork in Pala (Bar la), a nomadic pastoralist group in what
is now called the Tibetan Autonomous Region. We conducted research there in 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1990.
Fieldwork was conducted in all seasons and data were collected by participant observation, focused interviews
on sub-topics such as pasture rotation, local records, and a range of physical anthropological and ecological
measurements. Information on the traditional society was collected through open-ended interviews with
nomads who were adults during that era.
The findings from this fieldwork indicate that the nomadic pastoralists of Pal a were organized in a manner
analogous to the farming peasants described above-i.e., they were hereditarily tied to an estate and did not
have the freedom to unilaterally terminate the relationship and leave. Rather than free-ranging, semiautonomous tribe~, they were completely integrated into the political and socio-economic system of the Tibetan
state.
The Pala nomads belonged to a pastoral estate known as La rgyab Iho byang that consisted of 10 sub-units
(tsho) of which Pala was one. It was spread over a vast area covering hundreds of square miles on the Changdang
(Northern Plateau) at altitudes of 16,000-175,000', and was surrounded by other nomadic pastoral areas such
asZangs zangs to its south and Nag tshang to its north. The lord of Largyab Iho byangwas the Panchen Lama,
one of Tibet's most famous incarnate lamas. His administrative government was called Labrang (bla brang).
La rgyab Iho byang was subordinate to Bshad IlIthong Slllon, one ofthe Panchen Lama's five district-like
estates. Three local nomad officials (two tsho dpon and one sgar dpon) were appointed by the lords as overall
leaders. Each of the 10 sub-units (tsho) also had one or two headmen ('go pa) who were nomads appointed
by the three nomad officials in consultation with Bshad Ill/hong Sillon 's official called the 'Jad pa sde pa .
Since nomadic pastoralists live in tents and move their campsites to different pastures over the year, it
seems counter-intuitive initially to suggest that they were analogous to agricultural peasants. But, actually,
it was not difficult for lords of nomadic estates to implement parallel systems of land tenure, taxation and
subordination.
Land in Pala,just as in farming estates, was owned by the lord. And like farmers, the nomads had usufruct
rights on that land, but had no legal claim to it. Moreover, although nomads owned their animals, they were
bound to their estate (and lord) for the same reason as peasants on agricultural estates. Labor was necessary
to convert the lord's resource-pastureland-into
products that generated wealth.
The Pal a system was organized around a basic tax unit called mar khal ("butter khal") that was the
equivalent of the tax-rkang used in farming areas. The entire area of La rgyab Iho byang was divided into
named pastures each with an alloted number of mar khat.9 Each mar khal was equal to 13 yaks in 1956. In
turn, 6 sheep or 7 goats were considered equal to 1 yak {so that 78 sheep or 91 goats were equal to one mar
khal (13 x 6=78). The entire La rgyab Iho byang region, therefore, contained a fixed number of mar khal (of
pastureland) for which a fixed amount of taxes had to be provided to the lord on the basis of these mar khal.
Individual nomad households held pastureland in proportion to the number of livestock they held, and paid
taxes to their lord on that basis. For example, a household with 13 yaks would be allocated one mar khat of

pastureland and had to provide 1 mar khal 's worth of taxes-about
11 pounds of butter and various amounts
of the other products such as baby sheep skins, live animals, soda, yak saddles, salt, money, wool carrying bags,
felt yak saddle pads, yak skins, woven wool, rawhide ropes, and cheese.
Every three years, the lord conducted a formal census oflivestock and people called lebso (/eb rngod). On
the basis of this, the allocation of pasture to each household was adjusted depending on whether its livestock
had increased or decreased. This, in turn, was the basis of taxation for each household for the next three years
regardless of changes in herd size during that period.
The jural link between nomad and lord paralleled that of farmers in most ways. Pal a nomads were
hereditarily subject to their lord, the Panchen Lama, and even single-person households with no animals
(locally known as pho rang and mo rang) were compelled to pay taxes called mgo tam ("head-tranga [a type
of Tibetan money)"). Like farmers, the nomads of La rgyab Iho byang did not have the right to leave their area
permanently for another lord. The above mentioned customs of "human lease" (called in Pala mi khral
["person tax"] instead of m; bogs), "person exchange" (mi brje) and "person release (here called dpon 'khrol)
existed here, as did the right of forcible return of runaways (mi rtsa yul bkog).
Immediately south of La rgyab Iho byang was another nomadic pastoralist area called Zangs zangs. These
nomads differed from La rgyab Iho byang in that their lord was the Tibetan government (in the person of Sa
dga'district). In other words, these nomads were the equivalent ofthe agriculturalgzhung rgyugpa mentioned
earlier. However, like La rgyab Iho byang they employed a system of three year censuses with pasture
reallocation,lO and the institutions of m; khral, dpon 'khrol and 1/1; brje were present as was the right of
retrieving runaway serfs (mi rtsa yul bkug).
Consequently, the,nomadic pastoralists in both La rgyab Iho byang (pala) and Zangs zangs were
incorporated into the Tibetan "tribute" political economy in a manner analogous to farmers. The basic logic
of the serf farming economy-ensuring
that lords had a productive resource-land-and
also a permanent,
subordinate labor source was applicable to these nomadic areas.

Cox's Example of Sakya monastery
Mr. Cox's recent response
meant to show that Changdang
identifying who these nomads
nomads mentioned in Norbu's

presented quotes (taken from Dr. Dawa Norbu's book Red Star over Tibet) 11
nomads were not serfs of monastic lords to whom they provided taxes. Without
are or where they lived, he presents two kinds of "evidence." One is that the
book gave products to monasteries only as gifts or offerings:

Once every year or two the Sakya monastery would send a mission, consisting of the chief
contrac&or, a tantric practitioner and three servants to collect donations for both the
monastery and the governor of western Tibet from the Changtang's different nomadic
groups. These donations consisted of yak, sheep and butter. The resources to be given,
however, were never just arbitrarily imposed on nomads by monastic official. Rather, the
amount to be donated was left up to the nomads themselves. (Cox 1993: 151-152).
The second is that they had their own local administrators:
The Changtang nomads maintained a high degree of independence and autonomy in their
relations with Tibet's monastic officials. Indeed, the central Tibetan government appointed
a local administrator from among the nomads themselves (Norbu 1987: 2). The fact that this
administrator worked independently, did not have to answer to other locally present state
officials, and was a member of the nomad community, enabled him to be flexible in the
implementation of his administrative duties, in such a way as to protect the autonomy of the
nomadic community. (Cox 1993: 151)
Both of these statements demonstrate a glaring lack of understanding
essential meaning of serfdom.

of Tibetan ethnology and of the

The first issue-missions
collecting donations-reveals
nothing about whether these nomads were
subjects of a lord (monastic or otherwise) to whom they paid taxes/tribute. Missions such as the one mentioned
were known as 'bul sdud ("collecting offerings"), and were commonly sent by monasteries to remote areas
that had no regular access to religious practitioners. The missions included a "tantric practitioner" because
the function of the mission was to provide services to the nomads in terms of rituals, divination and so forth.
In turn, the nomads gave offerings to the monk practitioner which were turned over to the originating religious
institution, although in some cases the practitioners themselves kept a portion ofthis and became wealthy. The
target nomad population was often not subject to the monastery sending the mission, and even ifit were, this
provision of religious services had nothing to do with a lord's collection of taxes. Consequently, the existence
of such a mission says nothing about the pol itico-economic status of the nomads to whom the mission was sent,
i.e. whether they had a lord, who that lord was, and what obligations they owed to that lord.
Although Dawa Norbu apparently does not say anything about who these nomads were, it seems from
Cox's citations that the lord of these nomads was the government, i.e., that they were gzhung rgyug pa in the
same manner as the nomads of Zangs zangs. I suspect this for the following reasons. First, Cox says that their
headman was appointed by the Tibetan central government. If they were subjects ofSakya monastery or some
other monastic lord, Sakya or that lord would have appointed their leader. And ifthey were truly autonomous,
they would have had leaders independent of the goverment (or lords). Moreover, if, as it seems, they were under
the government, this would also explain the cryptic comment that the mission was collecting donations for the
governor of Western Tibet. I have never heard of Q/~vone in traditional Tibet giving "donations" to the
government-only
taxes-so that it is likely these "donations" were in fact tax obligations. In any case, Cox's
example is too unclear to allow any conclusion about the status of these nomads, whoever and whereever they
were.
Cox's second argument makes an amazingjump oflogic. He argues that because the local official were
nomads, they could not be serfs (or bound subjects) of a lord. First, appointing local officials from among
subjects is the custom throughout Tibetan. On agricultural estates, the lord appoints a steward to manage his
demesne fields, but at the same time also appoints village headmen who function as the liaison between the
stewardllord and the villagers. Second, the presence of such local headmen in no way changes the "bound"
status of the villagers, nor does it free villagers from fulfilling their corvee and in-kind tax obligations, or give
them freedom to abrogate their bound status.
And as for local autonomy, serfdom does not mean that serfs had no local autonomy. Lords were not
interested in micro-managing the lives of the villagers or nomads. As long as their corvee obligations were
fulfilled, what serfs did with their time was of no concern to their lord. The genius of serfdom was precisely
that it enabled lords to generate substantial income with minimal input oftheir own time, energy and money.
Consequently, on a day to day basis, serfs/subjects could do as they pleased so long as they fulfilled their
hereditary obligations. In fact, the custom of having local people serve as officials meant the lords did not have
to bother with the mechanicsoftax organization within the village. The lord only had to deal with the headman,
who, in turn, was responsible for seeing that the corvee and in-kind taxes were provided on time. The essence
of systems of serfdom is hereditarily tying labor to land resources, and the nature of the recruitment of local
officials is irrelevant to that issue.
Finally, whatever the mode of production of these unidentified nomads, it in no way affects the validity
of my data on Pala. There may well have been nomads in Tibet who were lordless, but their existence in no
way implies that there were no nomads who were part of estates. Mr. Cox apparently has the naive notion that
there was one uniform nomad culture in traditional Tibet.

The Pala data reveal clearly that these nomadic pastoralists were integrated into the dominant political
economy found among Tibetan farmers prior to 1959. They show clearly that a nomadic subsistence economy
could be incorporated into a system of estates and lords. For the reasons stated above, I consider this mode to
be a form of serfdom. 12 Whether this will turn out to be valid for all of political Tibet's nomadic groups is
of course not certain since there are still no data on most of these . It appears to be valid for the adjacent nomad
areas such langs zangs, but more empirical research is needed before we can really begin to discuss Tibetan
nomadic pastoral society throughout the plateau.
Finally, a broader issue embedded in my exchange with Mr. Cox should be mentioned explicitly. Tibetan
ethnology is a relatively newfield. With only a few exceptions, professional ethnographic research in the ethnic
Tibetan areas outside of China began only in the 1970s, and even today there is hardly any socio-eultural
literature on Tibetans within China, e.g. those in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Kham and Amdo. As I
look at this literature, it is becoming increasingly evident that a key issue for contemporary Tibetan
anthropology is to delimit the range of social, cultural and political systems under which "ethnic Tibetans"
lived traditionally. All areas in the Tibetan culture area appear to share similarities in language, but there is
growing evidence of substantial variation in social arenas such as kinship, politics, and religion that will have
to be unraveled by careful, objective scholarly studies. For example, whereas the nomads of La rgyab had to
seek permission from their lord to join a monastery (chos 'khrol), the nomads of langs zangsdid not. Similarly,
the langs zangs nomads organized pasture reallocation on a community level whereas the La rgyab Iho byang
nomads did it on a household basis. Another study reports that the nomads in Damshung allocated pasture on
a lineage basis (Clarke 1992). Hopefully in the next decade we will be able to assess these differences and
similarities and develop an empirically based ethnology of the Tibetan culture area. If we are to succeed,
however, researchers will have to view Tibetan society objectively rather that through the emotional lens of
contemporary politics ..

1
While some Tibetans have argued that serfdom is not a valid term for Tibet's institutions, they have
done so with regard to villagers, not nomads. If there is a literature arguing that Tibetan nomads were not
serfs I do not know it and Mr. Cox cites no references for this assertion.
2
I am writing this response from Lhasa where I am currently conducting fieldwork so do not have
exact references for most publications other than my own.
3
The measure unit for this was the son khat ("seed-khaf'),
equaled roughly 31 lbs of barley.

one khat being a volume measure that

4
A tax-rkang of 12 son khal would mean planting 372 pounds (12 x 31 lbs.) of seed. At an average
yield of 5 times the seed planted, the total yield would be 1860 pounds of barley or a net yield of 1488
pounds after the seed for the next year is subtracted. For a household of 5 people, the per capita yield
would have been 298 pounds per person-slightly
more than what an adult would need for subsistence.
5
The corvee work obligation was not limited to farming the lord's demesne land. Corvee laborers did
a range of non-agricultural tasks such as wool work and collecting incense and firewood.

7
This is a merely an overview of a very complex system with a variety of types of estates and peasants
(e.g., khral pa, dud chung, and nang zan), and those interested in greater detail about different types of
peasants and obligations should consult the literature in the references.

8
In other words, even though a woman was living on the estate of her husband, she would would still
be a subject of her original lord as would all of her female children (and their female children). Her male
offspring, however, would belong to their father's lord.
9
A formal book called the rtswa khra ("pasture list") listed every pasture area and the number of mar
khal it contained.
10 The pastures in Zangs zangs were reallocated on the basis of sub-units (called rtswa shog) rather
than individual households
11 Although Dr. Norbu is a well known Tibetan scholar with a Ph.D. in political science, the information in this book on nomads derives from Dr. Norbu's recollections about his childhood, not from a
scholarly study he made of nomads.
12 While Mr. Cox implies that Tibetans arc in favor of their traditional politico-economic system, I
disagree. Regardless of the political views of today's rural Tibetans (in Tibet) with regards to independence or autonomy, I am confident that no one would agree to return to the system of estates and hereditary subservience that existed in Tibet before March, 1959.
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